Personal Relationships and Judicial Bias: New Guidance

The Supreme Court has recently dealt with a case in which an allegation of judicial bias was raised. The claim was based on the relationship of the judge to a solicitor in a firm instructed by one of the parties. The Supreme Court ultimately clarified the law in the area and set out the applicable principles as a matter of Irish law in a lengthy ruling. Our Commercial Disputes team examines the decision.

The Supreme Court has recently taken the opportunity to restate the law regarding judicial bias.[1] In doing so, it set out the law relating to objective bias and outlined that the test for establishing bias on the part of a judge is an onerous one to meet. The decision usefully restates, from the highest authority, the applicable Irish law on judicial bias. It confirms that the mere appearance of bias will not suffice and that, to require a judge to recuse themselves or be removed for bias, circumstances giving rise to clear and objective bias must be shown.

Background

The party that raised the allegation in this case had conducted protracted litigation arising out of his unsuccessful application for admission to a Master’s Degree course at University College Dublin in 2001. The litigation involved claims of discrimination. In the Circuit Court, he had unsuccessfully sought documentation from UCD and appealed to the High Court. The High Court appeal was determined by Mr Justice Meenan, who upheld the original decision. However, Mr Justice Meenan had been asked at the end of the hearing to recuse himself based on alleged objective and subjective bias. This was due to comments made that the appellant believed indicated his pre-determination of the application.

In making final orders, Mr Justice Meenan was again asked to recuse himself based on the appellant’s complaint lodged with the Judicial Conduct Committee. Having refused to do so, the appellant sought a leapfrog appeal[2] to the Supreme Court based on EU law and bias. Two new allegations of bias were raised:

1. That Mr Justice Meenan and two of his children had attended UCD
2. That Mr Justice Meenan’s son worked as a senior associate at Arthur Cox LLP, the firm of solicitors on record for UCD.

Leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court was refused regarding the former allegation and the EU law point, but leave was granted for the latter. The specific question for determination, therefore, related to whether the test for objective bias was met where a judge’s close relative worked in the solicitors firm representing one of the parties.

Decision

Contrary to the appellant’s assertion, the Supreme Court confirmed that Irish law had no rule regarding ‘automatic disqualification’ of judges. Relying on prior Supreme Court case law,[3] it noted that, under Irish law, it:

“has always been recognised that it is not the relationship per se that disqualifies: it is the relationship having regard to the role played by the individual in the proceedings before the judge”.

Looking at the relevant test for bias, the ultimate question for a court to determine in every case is whether a reasonable observer would have a reasonable suspicion of bias. In determining that question, it noted that the test is strict and should be applied rigorously - “Too low a standard will damage, rather than promote, public confidence”. In this regard, objective bias must be demonstrated by showing a reasonable apprehension that the judge will not provide a fair and impartial hearing. A party making such a claim must establish a rational, cogent, and logical connection between their concern and the relevant circumstances.

In the specific context of the relationship between a judge and a lawyer in a case the judge is hearing, the Chief Justice went on to elaborate some principles. First, if a close relative actually represents a party as a lawyer – whether solicitor or barrister, the judge should not hear it. In considering who might constitute a ‘close relative’, the Chief Justice had regard to the Judicial Council’s Guidelines for Judicial Conduct and Ethics and the UN’s Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct. The former includes “spouse, civil partner, son, daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, and any other close relative or person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household” as a member of a judge’s family. The code of conduct provides that a judge should not participate in the determination of a case in which a member of their family is representing a litigant or is otherwise associated.

However, where a close relative of a judge is employed in a firm acting for a party, the Chief Justice observed that various factors need to be taken into account to determine the issue. These include

1. The extent of involvement of the relative
2. Any direct and/or significant financial interest they may have in the outcome of the matter
3. Any involvement they may have with the lawyers actually working on the matter, and
4. The size of the firm involved

Critically, however, if the relative of the judge is employed in a large firm but has no personal involvement and no financial interest in the outcome of the case, then disqualification is not justified. On the facts here, the Supreme Court was satisfied that Mr Justice Meenan’s son, while employed by one of the largest law firms in the country, did not personally work on the matter and had no interest in the result. Accordingly, it concluded that Mr Justice Meenan was not disqualified from hearing the matter and did not need to recuse himself.

Conclusion

The decision is a novel and important one, especially in a jurisdiction like Ireland where the population is relatively small and where children of lawyers may follow them into legal careers, whether as solicitor or barrister. Although it is somewhat surprising that it had not arisen before, it is useful to have guidance from a high authority for when an analogous situation arises in future. The decision usefully restates Irish law on objective bias, before addressing the specific scenario in that context.

It is clear from the decision that, even where the judge’s relationship may be close, if the relevant individual is not directly involved in the matter, especially in a large firm, a recusal is unlikely to be required. The decision is useful for, and should give confidence to, those who may be involved in proceedings faced with similar applications. Similarly, anyone considering bringing a recusal application arising from a relevant party’s relationship with a judge should first be aware of the clear guidance provided by the Supreme Court.

For more information and expert advice on commercial disputes, contact a member of our Commercial Disputes team.

The content of this article is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute legal or other advice.

[1] Kelly v UCD [2025] IESC 6.

[2] The initial and standard route of appeal from the High Court is to the Court of Appeal. Applications to appeal from the High Court directly to the Supreme Court, by-passing the Court of Appeal, are known as leapfrog appeals.

[3] Kenny v Trinity College Dublin [2007] IESC 42